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[70 C.2d 327; '14 Cal.Rptr. 722. 450 P.2d 42)

[L. A. No. 29598.

In Bank. Feb. 13, 1969.]

HOLIDAY INNS OF AMERICA, INC., et at, Plaintiffs and
Appellants, v. D. :MANLEY KNIGHT et at, Defendants
and Respondents.
[1] Forfeitures - Relief - Under Statute. - The proscriptions of
Civ. Code, § 3275, against forfeiture apply in any case in which
the party seeking relief from default has brought himself within the terms of the section by pleading and proving facts that
justify its application; and in determining whether a given
case falls within the statute, it is necessary to consider the
nature of the contract and the specific clause in question.
'[2] Id.-Relief-Under Statute-Time as Essence of Condition.
-In a proper case, relief will be granted under Civ. Code,
§ 3275, providing for relief in case of forfeiture, from a provision of a contract making time of the essence in tendering
annual payments thereunder.
[5] Id.-Relief-Under Statute.-In an action by optionee's sue·
cessors to declare effective a Written contract granting a five. year option to purchase real estate with the price for the
option payable in five annual instalments, plaintiffs ;were entitled to summary judgment declaring the contract in' force, by
way of relief under Civ. Code, § 3275, relating to relief in case
of forfeiture if the contract were terminated, where it
appeared that the fourth instalment was not paid precisely on
time, that on a risk allocation basis each instalment was partially for an option to buy the land during that year and partially for renewal of the option for another year, that plaintiffs
would suffer a forfeiture of that part of the three instalments
previously paid attributable to the right to exercise the option
during the last two years by requiring payment strictly on
time, that plaintiffs were willing and able to continue with
performance of the contract and acted in good faith to
accomplish that end, and that optionor would receive the bene0' fit of his bargain, the full price of the option granted.
o

o

0

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Orange County. Herbert S. Herlands, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
.
[1] Relief of purchaser against forfeiture of land contract, note,
40 A.L.R. 182. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Forfeitures and Penalties, § 24
et seq; Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser (1st ed § 642).
!ticK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Forfeitures, § 17(1); [2] Forfeitures, § 17(3) .
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Action seeking a declaration that a contract was in full
force and effect. Summary judgment for defendants reversed
with directions.
Greenberg & Glusker, Arthur N. Greenberg and Harvey R.
Friedman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Gordon X. Richmond for Defendants and Respondents.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment for
defendants in an action seeking a declaration that a contract
was still effective. The judgment was entered after plaintiffs' .
motion for a summary judgment was denied and defendants'
motion for summary judgment was granted.
The pleadings and affidavits of the parties establish the
following undisputed facts.
Plaintiffs are the successors in interest to the optionee
under a written option contract between the optionee and the
owners of the option property, defendant D. Manley Knight
and his mother Mary Knight. Mary Knight is now deceased
and D. Manley Knight is the sole owner of the property.
Although his wife is also named a defendant herein, she has
no interest in the contract or the option property. We will
therefore refer to D. Manley Knight as defendant.
The contract, executed on September 30, 1963, granted: an
option to purchase real property in Orange County for
$198,633, the price to be subject, however, to prescribed
adjustments for changes in the cost of living. Unless cancelled
as provided in the agreement, the option could be exercised by
giving written notice thereof no later than April 1, 1968. The
contract provided for an initial payment of $10,000 and for
four additional payments of $10,000 to be made directly to
the optionors on July 1 of each year, commencing in 1964, .
unless the option was exercised or cancelled before the· next
such payment became due. These payments were not to be
applied to the purchase price. The cancellation provision provided that "it is mutually understood that failure to make
payment on or before the prescribed date will automatically
cancel this option without further notice." On December 9,
1963, the parties- amen'ded the contract by executing escrow
instructions that provided that the annual payments were to
be deposited in escrow with the Security Title Insurance
Company, and that, in "the event you [Security Title] do not
receive the $10,000 annual payments [by July 1] and upon
receiving notice from 'Optionors to cancel the option, without
I
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further instructions from Optionee you are to terminate the
escrow. "
The initial payment of $10,000 and the annual installm°ents
for 1964 and 1965 were paid. After the execution of the contract, plaintiffs expended "great amounts of money" to
develop a major residential and commercial center on the land
adjacent to the option property. These expenditures have
caused the option property to increase substantially in value
since the contract was executed. Plaintiffs' purpose in entering into the contract was to put themselves in a position to
secure the advantage of this increase in value resulting from
their development efforts.
In 1966 plaintiffs mailed a check for $10,000 to defendant.
It was made out to D. Manley Knight and his wife, Lavinia
Knight, and dated June 30, 1966. Defendant received the
°check on July 2, 1966 and returned it to plaintiffs on July 8,
stating that the option contract was cancelled. On July 8
plaintiffs tendered another check directly to defendant, and
he again refused it. On July 15 plaintiffs deposited a $10,000
check with Security Title payable to defendant. Security Title
tendered the check to defendant, but his attorney returned it
to plaintiffs on JUly 27 and advised them that the agreement
was terminated pursuant to the cancellation provision.
Plaintiffs contend that payment of the annual installment
was timely on the ground that the check became the property
of defendant when mailed; that even if the payment was late,
the trial court should have relieved them from forfeiture and
declared the option in force under section 3275 of the Civil
Code; and that, in any event, the trial court erred in excluding extrinsic evidence offered to prove that the escrow instructions modified the contract to permit payment at any time
before defendant notified the title company that the option
was cancelled. Since the undisputed facts establish that plaintiffs are entitled to relief from forfeiture pursuant to section
3275, it is unnecessary to consider plaintiffs' other contentions. 1
Section 3275 provides: "Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in tbe
lPlaintiifll' initial declaration in support of their motion for summary
judgment was insufficient to support a judgment in their favor. Before
entering judgment for defendants, however, the trial court agreed to
reconsider its initial ruling on the motions of both plaintiffs and defendants for summary jUdgment, and additional declarations were filed. The
undisputed facts establishing plaintiffs' right to relief from forfeiture
appear from the declarations filed by both aides.
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nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to comply with
its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full
compensation to the other party, except in the case of a
grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty."
The tumultuous history of this section has been recorded in a
lengthy series of major decisions in the area of property and
contract law. 2
[1] Although most of the cases considering section 3275
have involved land sale contracts, its proscriptions against
forfeiture apply in any case in which the party seeking relief
from default has brought himself within the terms of the
section by pleading and proving facts that justify its application. (Barkis v. Scott, supra, at pp. 118, 120.) In determining
whether a given case falls within section 3275, however, it is
necessary to consider the nature of the contract and the specific clause in question. Although the contract in the instant
case is an option contract, the question is not whether the
exercise of the option was timely, but whether the right to
exercise the option in the future was forfeited by a failure to
pay the consideration for that right precisely on time. Defendant's reliance on Cummings v. Bullock (9th Cir. 1966)
367 F.2d 182, and Wilson v. Ward (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 390
[317 P .2d 1018], is therefore misplaced. Both those cases dealt
with the time within which an option must be exercised and
correctly held that such time cannot be extended beyond that
provided in the contract. To hold otherwise would give the
optionee, not the option he bargained for, but a longer and
therefore more extensive option. [2] In the present case,
however, plaintiffs are not seeking to extend the period during.
2Gloc7c v. Howard cf Wilson Colony Co. (1898) 123 Cal. 1 [55 P. 713,
G9 Am.St.Rep. 17,43 L.R.A. 199]; Bar7cis v. Scott (1949) 34 Cal.2d 116
1208 P.2d 367]; Baffa v. Johnson (1950) 35 Cal.2d 36 [216 P.2d 13];
Freedman v. Rector etc. ot St. Matthias Parish (1951) 37 Cal.2d 16
1!:!30 P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1]; Ward v. Union Bond cf Trust Co. (9th
Cir. 1957) 243 F.2d 476; Caplan v. Schroeder (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 515 [15
Cal.Rptr. 145, 364 P.2d 321]; Crane, Recent Decisions on Damages in
Commercial Cases in California (1960) 12 Hastings L ..T. 109, 119-121;
Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of
the Law (1965) 53 Cal.L.Rev. 151; Hetland, The California Land Contract (1960) 48 Ca1.L.Rev. 729; Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law
of Contracts (1961) 13 Stan.L.Rev. 812, 849·856; Smith, Contractual
Con11'ols of Damages in Commercial Transactions (1960) 12 Hastings
L.J. 122, 134·140; Note, Is it Possible to Contract for an Exact Performance.? (1949) 37 Cal.L.Rev. 498; Note, Rights of the Defaulting
Vendee (1949) 37 Ca1.L.Rev. 704; Comment, Defaulting Vendee Relieved
from Forfeiture (1949) 2 Stan.L.Rev. 235; Note, Installment Land Sale
Contract: Termination of the Vendee's Rights After Default (1956)
3 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 264; Note, Application ot Civil Code, Section 3275 to
Relieve trom FOl·teifure (1949) 23 So.CaJ.L.Rev. 110.
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which the option can be exercised but only to secure relief
from the provision making time of the essence in tendering
the annual payments. (See Scarbery v. Bill Patch Land ((7
lVater 00. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 87, 102, 103 [7 Cal.Rptr.
408].) In a proper case, relief will be granted under section
3275 from such a provision. (Barkis v. Bcott, supra, at p.
122.)
[3] The sole issue in this case is whether the plaintiffs
have brought themselves within section 3275; whether there
would be a loss in the nature of a forfeiture. suffered by plaintiffs if the option contract were terminated. Essentially, the
position of defendant is that there is no forfeiture since plaintiffs got precisely what they bargained for, namely, the exclusive right to buy the property for the three years during
which they made payments. Cancellation because of the late
1966 payment amounts to nothing more than terminating a
contract providing for that exclusive right during 1966. As
viewed by defendant, this contract is in effect wholly executory and therefore its termination would not result in a forfeiture to either party. (Martin v. Morgan (1890) 87 Cal. 203
[25 P. 350, 22 Am.St.Rep. 240].)
To sustain defendant's argument, the contract would have
to be viewed as a series of independent contracts, each for a
one-year option. Only if this were true, could it be said that
plaintiffs received their bargained for equivalent of the
$30,000 payments. (Sheveland v. Reed (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d
820, 822 [324 P.2d 633].) The economic realities of the transaction, however, do not support this analysis. First, the language of the agreement states that the "Optionors hereby
grant to Optionee the exclusive right and option for a :five
year period. . . ." The parties agreed to bind themselves to a
period of :five years with the price payable in five installments.
On the basis of risk allocation, it is clear that each payment of
the $10,000 installment was partially for an option to buy the
land during that year and partially for a renewal of the
option for another year up to a total of five years. With the
passage of time, plaintiffs have paid more and more for the
right to renew, and it is this right that would be forfeited by
requiring payment strictly on time. At the time the forfeiture
was declared, plaintiffs had paid a substantial part of the
$30,000 for the right to exercise the option during the last two
years. Thus, they have not received what they bargained for
and they have lost more than the benefit of their bargain. In
short, they will suffer a forfeiture of that part of the $30,000
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attributable to the right to exercise the option during the last
two years. s
Plaintiffs have at all times remained willing and able to
continue with the performance of the contract and have acted
in good faith to accomplish this end. Defendant has not
suffered any injury justifying termination of the contract,
and none of his reasonable expectations have been defeated.'
Moreover, he will receive the benefit of his bargain, namely,
the full price of the option granted plaintiffs. As we stated in
Barkis, "when the default has not been serious and the
vendee is willing and able to continue with his performance of
the contract, the vendor suffers no damage by allowing the
vendee to do so." (Barkis v. Scott, supra, at p. 122.)
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed to
enter a. summary judgment for plaintiffs in accord with the
views herein expressed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.

)
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3Plaintiffs also allege forfeiture of "great amounts of money" expended for the development of surrounding land. Evidently none of the
investment was made in the option property. Since there is nothing to
indicate that the development was not highly profitable in its own right
01' that inclusion of defendant's property was necessary to make the
dovelopment a success, it would not seem that any part of these expenditures can be considered forfeite<l by a termination of the eontract. (Cf.
Scarbery v. Bill Patch Land t/' Water Co., supra, where the plaintiff
offered evidence justifying the allocation of eollateral development expenditures to the amounts forfeited by cancellation.)
·Although the initial tender was made to defendant and his wife and
not to the Security Title Insurance Company as the escrow instruetions
specified, it gave defendant notice within one day of thQ due date that
plaintiffs sought to keep the contract in force.
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